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Abstract: 
Laclau and Mouffe’s political vision of a radical democracy is an attempt to rethink the 
emancipatory tradition of the left in light of the recognition of the impossibility of a sutured society. 
The classic emancipatory projects, whether liberal, anarchic or socialist shared an (ultimately 
eschatological or universalist) belief in the possibility of a social order without (serious) 
contradictions. The 20. century is marked by an increasingly distrust towards the possibility of 
universality. Laclau and Mouffe share this distrust, but they claim that the way they restate the 
relationship between (impossible) universality and particularity opens up to an radicalisation of 
democracy. This paper presents Laclau and Mouffe's vision of radical democracy, and argues that it 
has clear advantages over deliberative democracy, even though the latter to a large extent has 
managed to 'hegemonise' the space of the radical alternative to mainstream liberal representative 
democracy. However, there are certain problems in Laclau and Mouffe's position. The paper will 
take a closer look at the most present of these problems. Laclau and Mouffe's implicit frame has so 
far been the nation state. Mouffe has in later writings more explicitly dealt with the issue of 
globalisation. This is obviously a necessary move, but her global vision – a 'multipolar world order' 
– to my view so far has serious short comings, when viewed from their own theoretical perspective. 
The paper starts with situating Laclau and Mouffe's radical democracy in relation to the socialist 
tradition, and the attempts in the 60ies and 70ies of renewing this tradition by way of a demand for 
a (more) participatory democracy. Its then criticises the deliberative model, and therefore refuses 
the dominant position this model has acquired as the heir of the participatory tradition. The criticism 
centres on the claim of the irreducible presence of power and exclusion in all social relations, even 
those which may have been established in consensus. This is exactly the point of departure for 
Laclau and Mouffe's conflictual vision of radical democracy. The paper presents the core concepts 
of this model (hegemonic universalism, 'agonism', passions and the people), and argues that radical 
democracy must, as Derrida put it, remain a promise, a democracy to come (a venir). The paper 
ends with a critical assessment of Mouffe's attempt to solve the (obvious) shortcoming in the focus 
on the nation state. Even though this move must be fully appreciated, her current theorising is 
unsatisfactory. In stead I argue what is needed is a vision of a 'popular cosmopolitanism', i.e. a 
cosmopolitanism facing up to exclusions, power and disagreements.  
 
Radical democracy, socialism and the participatory tradition
Laclau and Mouffe explicitly place their radical democracy as an attempt of a renewal of the 
left(Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 1987). The 'nodal point' of this renewal is the inversion of the 
relationship between socialism and democracy, claiming that socialism is to be seen as but one 
(however central) moment of the deepening of the 'democratic revolution' (Lefort 1988). As is well 
know the socialist – at least the Marxist - left has traditionally had a ambiguous attitude towards 
democracy. Within classical stagiest Marxism democracy was the ideological/ political 
superstructure for the bourgeoisie covering up the class struggles based on the continued relations 
of (indirect) usurpation in the economic sphere. Democracy was believed to become unnecessary 
after the proletarian revolution, since the emancipation of the working class would coincide with the 
emancipation of humanity as such. The closing of the ages of class struggles would make 
democracy – as a means of solutions of conflicts – redundant, and it would wither away together 
with the state. As Engels quoted Saint-Simon, the aim was to replace “the government of men by 
the administration of things”. 
The idea behind such a political vision was the proletariat as a strictly universal agent. Since 
the proletariat was the first class to evolve which was completely devoid any form of ownership to 
the means of production, their liberation would not be limited to themselves, as had the liberations 
of the bourgeoisie been, but would be, exactly, a universal emancipation. All ready here, we can see 
the tricky relationship between universalism and democracy, since it obviously the idea of an 
'actually existing' universal agent which leads to the jeopardising of democracy. We shall return to 
the tension between universality and democracy later in the paper. 
After WW II, and especially the experiences with the absence of democracy in the 'real 
existing socialism' the so called New Left increasing sought to integrate socialism and democracy. 
One of the cornerstones of such a radicalisation of democracy became the demand of revitalisation 
of democracy by means of participation (Pateman 1970; Macpherson 1977; Koch 1981 (1946); For 
a more recent contribution, see Barber 1984) The claim was - pace the self proclaimed 'realists' - 
that real democracy could only mean wide participation in all kinds of decision making. Wide in 
terms of social spheres, democracy not being limited to the political sphere but spread out to the 
economy, education, the relations between the sexes and so forth. Wide also in terms of the number 
of citizens participating in decision making relevant to their own lives. To view democracy as a 
simple means for choosing between elites was a far too narrow vision of democracy, and actually 
dangerous for democracy it self, causing the problem of 'apathy' amongst the average citizens, the 
excuse for the 'realist' model in the first place.
Participation in democracy as a way out of the alleged 'apathy' was one of the three typical 
arguments in favour of participatory democracy. The claim was simply that (wo)man is not born 
a good democrat, it is something she becomes by participating in democratic settings. As was 
pointed out, this argument was not invented by the advocates of a radicalised participatory 
democracy, but by wholehearted liberals such as John Stuart Mills (Mill 1991 (1861)) (C.f. Alf 
Ross who despite his severe criticism of Koch and advocates of direct democracy has a clear 
view of the necessity of democratic 'upbringing' of the populace (Ross 1967 (1946)).)  The 
second point made in favour of participation was equality. Democracy means rule by the people, 
inherent in which must be a relatively high degree of equality in influence and decision making 
powers. At the least what was wanted was a much more equal distribution than is the case when 
democracy simply means choosing between elites. The third point was that it is only through 
participation that agreement on the common good can be established. To advocates of a 
participatory democracy the liberal denial of a common good is antithetical to the very idea of 
democracy1 As 'rule by the people' the very purpose of democracy includes some kind of 
common good, not reducible to the (aggregated) sum of individual wills. The common good 
argument meets with the idea of upbringing to democracy, since it is through participation that 
we come to realise the particularity of our 'spontaneous' interests and come to identify with the 
'higher' general purpose or the common good. (as Pateman notes, this will eventually make 
citizens more akin to accept decisions taken on higher (national) levels, thereby strengthening 
also the representative parts of a well functioning democracy. (Pateman 1970)) 
As is probably well known the number of advocates of traditional participatory democracy is 
quite limited these days. The decrease in their number might be due to disappointment from sad 
experience of participation or stem from a more philosophical critique of the idea of participation.  
No matter whether it is the one or the other – a most likely a combination of the two – there can be 
no doubt that there is a set of serious difficulties in the theory of participation. The first problem has 
been pointed out by Robert A Dahl, who calls it the “democratic paradox of size”. The point is that 
the issues that matter involve a huge number of citizens, making the individual citizens influence 
rather superficial, whereas the cases in which we might gain real influence are generally not of a 
kind that anyone would consider essential. As he puts it: 
“In very small systems a citizen may be able to participate in decisions that do 
not matter much but cannot participate much in decisions that really matter a great 
1 Cf. Alf Ross who from a strictly representative ideal of democracy argues in favour of a common 
good as the essence of democracy. To him, however, it takes the best men of the country to be 
able to lift oneself above narrow self-interest and realise ”better than would have been the case if 
the people had done it themselves, the true and lasting interests of the people” (Ross 1967 
(1946)) 
deal; whereas very large systems may be able to cope with problems that matter more 
to a citizen, the opportunities for the citizen to participate in and greatly influence 
decisions are vastly reduced. Taken to an extreme but perhaps not wholly fanciful 
limit, the paradox would pose a choice between a tiny unit in which citizens could 
exercise perfect control over, say, the location and upkeep of footpaths; or a world 
government necessary for preserving life on the planet by preventing acute 
environmental degradation, but over which citizens had only symbolic democratic 
control.” (Dahl 1994: 28)
 Dahl's invocation of a global problematic is something I return to, suffice it here to claim that 
he's point is undeniable, and leads to the recognition of some kind of representative body, holding 
decision making powers beyond what can be established solely by means of broad citizens 
participation. Of course many participatory thinkers have realised this (e.g. Pateman and Koch, 
more than MacPherson), but it raises two further problems, only insufficiently dealt with in the 
tradition. The first is the possibility of 'learning democracy' through participation in issues that does 
not really matter that much; the second is the problem of reaching agreement. Regarding the first, 
Jon Elster has been one the sternest critics pointing out, that upbring to democracy must be 
“essentially a bi-product”, i.e. something that cannot be aquired if we aim at it in a direct way 
(Elster 1983). Regarding de Tocqueville's analysis of lay magistrates he points out that their verdicts 
are actually not always legally correct. According to de Tocqueville this deficiency is outweighed 
by the citizens upbringing brought about by the participation in the courts. However, as Elster 
points out, the upbringing effect is lost the moment the lay magistrates come to realise that their 
verdicts are not as good as could be. To Elster this conclusion is transferable to participatory 
democracy, and he points out that we only learn something, that we actually become good 
democratic citizens, to the extent that the issues we participate in matters to us. I believe Elster is 
absolutely right, hence the problem for participatory democracy. The same problem can be traced in 
Pateman's criticism of J. S. Mill and his indigenous idea of bringing local men (of lower grade) in 
contact with the educated men holding the executive places, thereby educating them to (responsible) 
citizens (Mill, 1991: 289f). Pateman rightly asks why we should be willing to engage in processes 
the result of which we do not influence?  (Pateman, 1970: 33). Convincingly, her own answer is in 
the negative. However this cannot but weaken her own optimism on the degree of agreement it is 
possible to reach between lower participatory and higher representative levels of democracy. As we 
shall see, this optimism is based in a belief in the common good, articulated in strict universalist 
terms. 
If participation in all areas of life – and especially in those that really matters – is impossible, 
how do deal with the likely event of disagreements between higher and lower levels? Basically, 
none of the participatory thinkers really deals with problem, and it is easy to why. The reason is of 
course that upbringing to democracy turns us all into good citizens identifying with the common 
good. MacPherson points out how his model can only be realised in the absence of “fundamental 
oppositions”, which to him is basically economic. Pateman only touches upon the problem 
indirectly, if telling. In a footnote she approvingly quotes Rousseau stating that “the whole point of 
the participatory situation is that each independent but interdependent individual is ‘forced’ to 
appreciate that there is only one right answer, to apply the word ‘each’ to himself.” (Pateman: 24 
n.1). 
At the danger of giving too much weight to a footnote I claim that this is the highly questionable 
logic behind all the participatory models: the hope that democracy it self would be able to 'raise us' 
to the level of universality, 'forcing us to appreciate that there is only one right answer'. This 
implicit universalism is, as mentioned, never really established in the participatory tradition, it is 
simply taken for granted. As I will show later, it is unsustainable, and the case for a radicalisation of 
democracy must look somewhere else for its “foundations”. However first it is necessary to pass by 
the democratic tradition which in its own and many others view is the heir of the radical tradition, 
i.e. the so-called deliberative democracy. 
Deliberative democracy
The idea that deliberative democracy is the radical version of democracy is quite common. One of 
its major exponents, John Dryzek for example states: ”Deliberative democracy has been the 
dominant theme in democratic theory for past decade and a half... In its emphasis on informed and 
critical citizen deliberation, deliberative democracy was a successor to models of participatory 
[democracy, adh] popular in the 1960s and 1970s... ” (Dryzek 2007: 265). Since the deliberative 
model is definitely not the only radical vision, this strictly hegemonising move by deliberative 
theorists unfortunately covers up, what should be the real debates of radicalisation of democracy. 
It is true that deliberative democracy comes after the participatory models, and it is true that it 
maintains certain of its themes while excludes other. Deliberative democracy maintains certain of 
the positive injunctions from participatory democracy. The aims of deliberative theorists are 
commendable: To reintroduce morality and justice into politics against realist and economic 
inspired 'realists' and aggregative thinkers. As Mouffe suggests, ”they seek to give new meaning to 
traditional democratic notions such as autonomy, popular sovereignty and equality. They aim at 
restating the classical idea of the public sphere, giving it a central place in the democratic project.” 
(Mouffe 2007: 36) (See also (Mouffe 2000b: 45).What deliberative democracy does is to maintain 
the idea of consensus and the common good, but re-interpret these within the frame of Habermasian 
theory of rationality: the aim of democracy is to facilitate – as close as possible –  power-free 
communications, which will lead to rational decisions (Habermas 1987). Beside from the explicit 
introduction of rationality, what deliberative democracy also does is to refrain from the demand of 
broad participation. As Carleheden puts it, democratic legitimacy stems not from everybody having 
actually been heard, but from everybody having had the opportunities for being heard (Carleheden 
1994). 
It is easy to see how deliberative democracy is based on a re-interpretation of the possibility of 
universalism in democracy. To the traditional Marxist-socialist projects, universalism arose from the 
universality of the agent of change: the proletariat was the Revolutionary Subject do to its place in 
the relations of productions. (In this sense it was of course only an inversion of Hegel's belief in 
Bureaucracy). Habermas and the deliberative democrats avoid pointing out privileged positions 
from where universality can be ensured. But they maintain the very ideal of reaching universality, 
namely through the “force-less force” of the better argument in the ideal speech situation.  
From a post-foundational perspective the idea of the force-less force and the very possibility of 
reaching rationality appear doubtful. When translated to democratic theory as in the case of 
deliberative democracy (at least) two sets of problems appears. The first is that consensus is 
unlikely, and should it be achieved it is not rational. The second is that the combination of the 
(faulty) belief in rationality through agreement and the weakening of the demand of general or 
broad participation easily lead the protagonists of deliberative democracy into an elitist position. 
Even though Habermas (as well as some of his prominent followers as e.g. Axel Honneth) in his 
latest writings appear to have renounced on the demand for consensus as well as the possibility of  
rationality in the strict sense, there is no doubt that rationality stills functions as some kind of 
regulative ideal, and that democracy, in the last instance is preferred because it is a social order 
which allows for the closest approximations of this ideal. As Mouffe has pointed out on several 
occasions the problem with the ideal of rationality is that it blinds us to the use of power and 
exclusions inherent in any process of decision. On a first, immediate level is quite obvious that 
consensus and agreements are not the dominant picture of politics in modern societies. Of course 
deliberatists might well, as did the participatorists, argue that this is a sign of illness that need to be 
cured, and that it can be cured under the right circumstances: if actual decision making was 
organised according to the principles of deliberative democracy, (much more) consensus would be 
the result. 
However, on a more philosophical level, the problem is whether decisions can be made rationally, 
and without any use of force. If this is not the case, the very idea of rationality as the aim of 
democracy is problematised. 
What this means is, that even in the (unlikely) situation of actually reaching consensus exclusion 
and coercion has been involved. Why? Consensus is to be reached, it is not there from the 
beginning – this is why we need 'the better argument'. However, unless the 'grounds' on which what 
counts for 'a better argument' are themselves transcendentally given, some alternatives must have 
been excluded on less than absolute or rational grounds (Laclau 1991). The problem is that when 
we decided on something, that something cannot be completely exhausted by rational rules. This is 
what is implied in Derrida's notion of undecidability: nowhere – not even in the most refined 
philosophical systems – can the principle of rational necessity establish it self without some kind of 
'originary' decision, with out the introduction of some element that is not given by the principles of 
the system it self (Derrida 1990; Derrida 1992). If this is true, it means that any possible system is 
basically undecidable, and in the final instance 'rests' upon an originary exclusion of other 
possibilities. As Laclau concludes: 
”... the hiding of the ”ultimate” undecidability of any decision will never be 
complete and social coherence will only be achieved at the cost of  
repressing something that negates it. It is in this sense that any consensus, 
that any objective and differential system of rule implies, as its most 
essential possibility, a dimension of coercion” (Laclau 1990: 172).
 
It is this dimension of coercion, of the ever present facts of exclusions that needs to be taken 
explicitly into account in democratic theory, and which the deliberative model, constitutively blinds 
itself of. 
The second problem is an effect of the first one, namely that this longing for rationality, easily 
makes deliberative democracy slip into elitism. In order to make this point I take issue with Danish 
theorist, Loftager, who in a particular interesting move on the one hand accepts the impossibility of 
reaching of the ideal of rationality, and on the other hand purifies the deliberative claim of  
democratic legitimacy being established through 'the better argument'. I completely agree with 
Loftager in the impossibility of reaching rational agreements, but because he anyway sticks to the 
idea of the better argument, the problems in the deliberative tradition of blinding itself towards 
exclusions, and of the potential elitism. 
To participatory democrats reaching agreement on the common good was intimately linked to broad 
participation in democratic processes. To the deliberatists this link is contingent: an argument 
cannot be considered right just because it has a majority of adherents. Equally it cannot be 
considered wrong because only few stick to it. According to Loftager, what the deliberative model 
makes explicit, but what constitutes democracy as such, is the victory of the better argument 
(Loftager 2004: 39f). He claims that the broadly accepted norm of equality between individuals 
actually is an ideal that has been imported from the aggregative model (and has, by several authors 
been proven impossible to realise). In stead Loftager suggests it is not essential to democracy that 
the largest number of individuals holding a certain interest or idea gets their way, but rather that ‘the 
better argument’ does. This immediately removes some of the pressure of full participation, since 
the advance of the better argument is not dependent on actual participation, only on general 
possibility of public participation in promoting better arguments (ibid: 41). Loftager refuses the 
ideal that all (affected) citizens should exert equal influence on political decisions. Since it is the 
arguments rather than individuals and their preferences that are the basic unit in democracy, it 
follows that there is no necessary relation between the better argument and the single citizen, who’s 
not always right. The citizen’s points of view must be put to the test in public reasoning (ibid: 42), 
and our equal (possible) access to the public sphere(s) is what guarantees a (new form of) political 
equality. Therefore, what the affected should be included into, is not a decision making body, but 
rather a general public sphere. To the quite obvious question of where decisions are then to be 
made, Loftager introduces the well known representative bodies. Elected politicians should after 
substantial deliberation in the public sphere, make the decisions that favour the ‘better argument’. 
Loftager’s arguments are interesting, because it carries the ultimately undemocratic logic of 
rationality to its very end.  To the extent that decisions must be made, what at a given point stands 
out as the better argument is going to be the topic of new disagreements. To argue that the decision 
makers act democratically to the extent they accept and decide in accordance with the better 
argument, provided through the general public, simply does not help very much, since the very 
determination of what is the better argument is likely to be the topic of other disputes. Loftager is 
well aware of this and points out that deeper deliberation about concrete practical problems might 
well produce more rather than less disagreement (Loftager 2004: 42). To argue that decisions should 
be made by elected representatives based on debates in a public sphere, might solve the practical 
problem of decision, but obviously undercuts any claim to rationality only established in 
agreements. 
What Loftager effectively does, in a move inherent in the very logic deliberative democracy is to 
de-radicalise democracy and open up to the legitimation of elitism. If what count is not the number 
of citizens who have actually taken part in the democratic process, but rather that the better 
argument won, those best equipped to present their points of views as the better arguments will 
favour (Young 2000). Secondly, if decisions still are to be taken by elected bodies, either any claim 
to rationality is lost, or one would end in the situation having to identify the better argument with 
the actual will of the majority. I believe both problems are quite unsettling for deliberative 
democracy, and sufficient for drawing the conclusion that the legitimacy of democracy most be 
separated from aspirations of rationality, and rethought in light of unavoidable decision making and 
exclusions. Since we never reach the point of universality, neither by an agent pre-disposed for the 
task, or through putting up situations like the ideal speech situation, will we always have to choose 
and decide between alternatives. No matter how well the debate has been formed, decisions making 
involves the exclusion of alternatives. Even in the probably very rare cases of unanimity a minimal 
amount of force – i.e. power – has been involved, namely the power it takes to 'suppress' 
alternatives that cannot be reduced to 'errors' in an algorithmic calculation. As Laclau puts it, this 
leads to the conclusion that democracy is not about making power disappear, but rather to shape 
power in accordance with the democratic principles of equality and liberty (Laclau 1993; Laclau 
2001).
Radical democracy and conflict
 
We now know that a theory of radicalised democracy has to take the impossibility of universality 
(and rationality) as its points of departure. Neither can we stick to the belief that it should be 
possible to reach a common good. Politics, conflicts and disagreements are with us in all 
foreseeable future. This is the starting point for Laclau and Mouffe's theory of radical democracy. 
The main lines of this theory are quite convincing. However there are certain problems, especially 
in the way particular Mouffe has tried to meet the challenges from increased globalisation. In this 
section I present the outline and basic concepts of their vision of radical democracy, partly in order 
to present the theory, partly in order to show how Mouffe's recent reflections on a 'multi polar world 
order' in its eager of distancing it self from cosmopolitanism ends up running counter to some of the 
very basic principles of radical democracy. 
Radical democracy is an attempt to re-articulate the emancipatory project of the left firmly within 
the frames of 'democratic revolution'. The basic reason for this move (from democracy qua 
socialism to socialism as a part of democracy) is the epistemological critique of universalism. To 
Marx it was the universal characteristics of the proletariat which made it the privileged agent for the 
liberation not only of itself as a class, but for humanity. As we've seen deliberative democracy does 
not count on a privileged agent in terms of a specific group, but rather in terms of rationality in the 
form of the better argument. Against this Laclau and Mouffe claim the impossibility of ever 
reaching the universal. This very impossibility is precisely what they claim to find an 
institutionalisation in democracy. Democracy institutionalises at the logic of universal values – 
equality and freedom for all – but at the very same time the impossibility of these values to become 
actualised as such. Democracy makes it impossible for any (particular) social force to be equated 
with these values: we know that whatever is done, it can only be done as a particular interpretation 
of the democratic ideals. This is why, in democracy, as Claude Lefort puts it, the place of power 
remains empty, and specific social forces are only allowed to occupy the place of the power 
temporarily (Lefort 1988). In this sense democracy is paradoxical: to the extent its basic values – 
equality and liberty for all – could be actualised, to the extent we'd reached the universals, it would 
make itself unnecessary: we would no longer need to keep the place of power empty.  But the 
universal cannot be reached, there will always be disagreements and therefore decisions and 
politics. Democracy should be seen  not as the way of securing rationality and overcoming power, 
but as a regime which organises power in a way that best fits our ideals of equality and liberty as 
well as keeping society 'open' making any idea of finalisation impossible. 
Within this general adherence to (liberal) democracy, Laclau and Mouffe seeks to spell out a left 
wing alternative of radicalising democracy, deepening it in light of ever present conflicts and power. 
The aim is to spread democracy to a range of social spheres, which means that the principles of 
equality and liberty should govern still more social relations, which will of course be of very 
different kinds. The forms of democracy will also be highly different, and should be thought of in 
many different forms. Even though Laclau and Mouffe obviously shares the ideas from 
participatory democracy of the broadening and deepening of democracy, they are critical of the idea 
of imagining participatory forms as the dominant. Not only because they do fit the complexities of 
differentiated social forms of today's world, but also because they are critical towards the theoretical 
foundations behind most pleas for participation. As we have seen, participation was thought to 
make the citizens recognise the common good. Laclau and Mouffe argue instead that the formation 
of political identities is a hegemonic game, and that the arrow goes as much from the representative 
to the represented as the other way round (Laclau 1993; Laclau 1996). But since politics is exactly 
about making decisions in an undecidable terrain, i.e. the formation of identities rather than their 
simple presentation as interests, this is not something to be looked upon as a second best, but rather 
as the main logic of democracy (Laclau 2002). 
Agonism, passions and 'the people'
In her later writings Mouffe (2000a; 2005; 2007)has termed her ideal agonistic democracy 2 With 
this she wants to underline that democracy – pace deliberative and liberalist interpretations – holds 
political oppositions and disagreements as a positive feature to be cherished rather than something 
to be overcome. As I've already shown, we can no longer dream of a 'sutured' or finalised society, 
from which all major disagreements has disappeared.  The impossibility of reaching universality 
necessitates that we come to terms with pluralism as something that forever produces oppositions 
and  disagreements – in short politics. But disagreements areis not only something to be accepted 
but rather endorsed. Why? Because disagreements dealt with under a democratic respect of the 
opponent – the adversary as Mouffe terms it – guarantees the openness of the exclusions following 
all decisions. Rather than blinding oneself from exclusions, which is the effect of viewing political 
processes as instances of rationality, democratic negotiations and decision making bring these 
exclusions to the fore, making the contingency of their – always temporary – solution visible. The 
radical democratic ambition should therefore be to make sure that problems and conflicts can be 
dealt with democratic in still more areas of social life. Agonistic democracy legitimises political 
conflict and disagreement, as long as these are 'processed' democratically that is in respect for other 
democratic positions – adversaries – and in the principle of different interpretations of the 
democratic principles of equality and liberty of all. Therefore agonistic or adversary democracy 
places a central weight on disagreements. 
Democracy is also based on agreement, or consensus. The agreement on the universal 
democratic principles of equality and liberty for all. However, such an agreement on principles 
will never be absolute, since these will always appear interpreted (articulated as discourse theory 
puts it). We will never be in a position where the principles can be agreed upon 'rationally' in a 
'pure' form. Rather such a basic agreement, without which democracy obviously could not work, 
must be understood as identifications with (tendentially) empty signifiers, which can be given a 
hold range of different interpretations. As Laclau has shown, such a set of identifications is – in the 
absence of any possible final (rational) ground – based upon a moment of affect (Laclau 2002; 
Laclau 2005b; Laclau 2005a). This leads us to the questions of passions in politics and democracy. 
  
• Democracy and passions  
• On forming strong democratic identities 
2 Partly inspired by William Connolly, (1995) 
• Strong identities are not formed by ’proving’ the rational superiority of democracy 
• Whait is needed is concrete experiences with democracy, and clear political differences for 
identifications. 
• A radical democratic projects is to create a democratic popular identity (Laclau 2006) 
• Not one democratic agent carrying human emancipation within.  
• Numerous and very different social areas – often with conflictual relations between them
• A radical democratic popular identity is one which is articulated with other democratic demands 
 
Radical democracy as a promise
•Radical democracy is also radical in its acceptance of the democratic paradox: the ‘true’, ultimate 
realisation of democracy would mean its abolition. 
-         To reach the true ’common good’ would make democracy superfluous
-         The many identities and interests never reach a ‘rational’ or prefect coupling 
• Radical democracy is a promise, a horison which must be reached for, without being able to be 
realised as such. (Derrida’s Notion of Democracy to come (Derrida 1994)) 
 
 
The global challenge
The huge challenge is globalisation 
• How to conceive of democracy beyond the nation state? 
• Cosmopolitanism 
– Much caught in a consensual, human rights centred vision
– Obvious danger for an excluding Western movement
•Hardt og Negri: Multitude/ Absolute democracy? (Hardt and Negri 2000; 2002)
– Point at the necessity of a globalisation of politics 
– But lack of politics (of hegemony): no creation of (popular) unity
• The crucial task is the articulation of a popular position, which articulates a hole set of democratic 
demands 
– fx Social Forum 
• A global popular identity around demands for democracy, social justice/ distribution and the 
protection of the environment  
• Could perhaps be the contours of a new radical leftwing project 
 
Critique of Mouffe’s Global vision
As with most of their former theorising, these considerations has primarily been directed towards 
‘domestic’ politics, but in her more recent work, the international scene has gained increasing 
attention (Mouffe 2002; 2004; 2005). In her analysis of the international realm she primarily 
criticises the cosmopolitan perspective, against which she has the same kind of objections as against 
liberal theories. She claims, whatever the form of cosmopolitanism, “they all postulate albeit in 
different guises, the availability of a form of consensual governance transcending the political, 
conflict and negativity” (Mouffe 2005: 106). Since a truly universal project in which a 
cosmopolitan democracy coincides with humanity is impossible, the very attempt of reaching it 
would be a dangerous illusion: “If such a project was ever realized, it could only signify the world 
hegemony of a dominant power that would have been able to impose its conception of the world on 
the entire planet, and which, identifying its interests with those of humanity, would treat any 
disagreement as an illegitimate challenge to its ‘rational’ leadership” (ibid: 107).
In stead she argues in favour of a leftist strategy of a ‘real pluralism’ which can only come to 
existence within a multi-polar world order, based on the existence of several regional blocks, 
providing “an equilibrium of forces among various large areas, instituting among them a new 
system of international law” (ibid: 116). 
This new normative anti-cosmopolitan project of a multi-polar world order is informed by 
scepticism towards two central figures in the cosmopolitan ideal, i.e. the idea of universal (and 
unpolitical) human rights, and the moral superiority of the West. She seems so eager to avoid these 
pitfalls, that the former constituents of a radical democracy – freedom and equality for all – no 
longer appears to be principles ‘universally’ attractive (with the qualification of course, that 
universality is always an articulated universality, modified by each instance of its incarnation). 
Let me just end this discussion by pointing out that I believe that the quest for (radical) democracy 
must off necessity be of a global character, just as the spreading of the principles of freedom and 
equality for all, most likely will take on the form of a spreading of (human) rights.3 To me it does 
not make much sense to oppose a claim for the spreading of democracy to the entire world, out of 
fear of it being hegemonised by the West, and used for promoting undemocratic aims. What is at 
stake is not limiting of the vision of global democracy – even of a liberal kind, with freedom and 
equality for all – but rather the dissociation of this visions from the actual actions of the West. As 
Gandhi said, western civilisation would be a good idea, and the fact that the West does not live up to 
its own proclaimed standards, should not make us renounce on the (general applicability of the) 
standards in favour of a ‘multi-polar’ world order, with potentially large areas remaining outside of 
democracy.
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